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In this paper, we present a comparative analysis of the extent to which indirect taxes, tariffs, and 
exchange rates affected relative price incentives for agricultural production in a representative 
sample of 15 developing countries in the 1990s. Empirical studies from the 1980s, using partial 
equilibrium methodologies, supported the view that policies in many developing countries imparted 
a major incentive bias against agriculture. Eliminating this bias was one of the goals of policy 
reform strategies, including structural adjustment programs, supported by the World Bank and 
others; and many countries undertook such reforms in the 1990s. In our sample, general equilibrium 
analysis indicates that, in the 1990s, the economywide system of indirect taxes, including tariffs and 
export taxes, significantly discriminated against agriculture in only one country, was largely neutral 
in five, provided a moderate subsidy to agriculture in four, and strongly favored agriculture in five. 
Earlier work assumed that overvaluation of the exchange rate would hurt agriculture, which was 
assumed to be largely tradable. In a general equilibrium setting, changes in the exchange rate can as 
demonstrated in this paper lead to anything between strongly increasing and decreasing relative 
agriculture/non-agriculture incentives, depending on relative trade shares. We conclude that, 
whatever incentive bias there was in the 1980s, it has mostly disappeared by the 1990s. We also 
find that it is difficult to generalize￿country specific circumstances greatly affect the relative 
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GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MEASURES OF AGRICULTURAL 





￿Getting prices right￿ was a rallying call when developing countries started re-orienting 
their economic policies in the early 1980s. Central to this effort was the understanding 
that trade and macroeconomic policies had negatively affected relative producer price 
incentives in the agriculture sector. The existence of such an incentive bias against 
agriculture was affirmed in the late 1980s by a major World Bank research project carried 
out under the direction of Anne O. Krueger (Krueger, Schiff, and ValdØs, 1988; Krueger, 
1992; Schiff and ValdØs, 1992; and Bautista and ValdØs, 1993). The research team 
analyzed data from the early 1960s to the mid-1980s and concluded that reductions in 
trade distortions such as import tariffs and export taxes and the removal of overvalued 
exchange rates should be vigorously pursued in economic reforms, and would improve 
agricultural price incentives. 
 
It is now clear that structural adjustment did not in general lead to a rapid and dramatic 
turn-around in the agricultural sector. During the 1980s and 1990s, large capital inflows 
in the form of foreign aid and loans from bilateral and multilateral sources were coupled 
with strong adjustment efforts to achieve stabilization and recovery in countries such as 
Mozambique (Arndt, Jensen, and Tarp, 2000). Nevertheless, the expansion of agricultural 
production was generally far below expectations. One potential explanation for the weak 
agricultural response to structural adjustment is that the agricultural incentive bias at the 
outset may have been smaller than originally thought. If so, reforms￿even when pursued 
whole-heartedly￿simply did not have the capacity to generate the results expected with 
regard to agriculture. 
 
One reason for believing that Krueger and her colleagues overstated the agricultural bias 
is that they relied on a partial equilibrium modeling methodology that misses intersectoral 
linkages and feedback effects from changes in incomes and relative prices. Furthermore, 
their reliance on nominal protection rates (NPRs) ignored potentially important relative 
price incentive effects due to differences in relative input cost-structures between 
agricultural and non-agricultural production. Finally, they assumed that domestic 
agricultural products and world market goods are perfect substitutes, and that essentially 
all agricultural goods are traded. This may well have led to overstating the agricultural 
bias, since variation in agricultural tradability is crucial for the transmission from trade 
policy interventions to relative domestic price incentives. 
 
New data in the form of economy-wide social accounting matrices (SAMs) have recently 
become available for a large number of countries. They allow us to shed fresh light on 
past perceptions and help clarify to what extent the agricultural incentive bias continues 
to exist. We have previously taken a look at the above questions in single-country studies 
of Tanzania and Mozambique using Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models 








suggested that the partial-equilibrium measures overstated the policy bias, and￿in 
contrast with established intuition￿that trade policies used to protect industrial 
production sectors might actually have improved relative price incentives for agricultural 
producers. With this background, we were motivated to go further and pursue the 
agricultural bias question in a broader, multi-country comparative context. 
 
The main purpose of the present paper is to measure agricultural policy bias in the 1990s 
for a sample of developing countries. We develop single-country CGE models, based on 
data that include agricultural detail, for each of the 15 countries in our sample. 
Subsequently, we go on to measure how indirect taxes, including import tariffs and 
export taxes, and current account imbalances have affected relative agricultural price 
incentives during the 1990s. Finally, a series of simulations of agricultural export taxes, 
non-agricultural import tariffs, and exchange rate appreciation and depreciation is carried 
out to study the impact of trade policies, traditionally applied to protect industrial 
production sectors. Further background for the study is presented in Section 2; country 
models and data sets are summarized in Section 3; results of the various simulations are 
reviewed in Section 4; and conclusions are offered in Section 5. 
 
 
2. Historical Background 
 
Until economic reforms were initiated in the early 1980s, many developing countries 
pursued a development strategy based on import substituting industrialization (ISI). At 
the root of this strategy was the notion that industrial progress represents a fast track to 
economic development. The industry sector was generally perceived as a sector with 
increasing returns to scale, and many developing countries saw achieving industrial 
development within a controlled political system as the essential role of the state. Infant 
industry sectors were, nevertheless, seen as highly vulnerable to outside competition due 
to widespread market failure, and a range of protective measures were implemented 
against imports of competing manufactured goods. 
 
Most of the protective policy measures can be categorized as either price-related trade 
interventions or quantitative restrictions, in the form of import tariffs and extensive 
licensing schemes. While trade interventions were only meant as temporary measures to 
protect infant industries, the whole system gradually became entrenched. Industries and 
governments came to rely on the interventions for protection and revenue collection, 
respectively. In addition, governments typically maintained an overvalued exchange rate 
to keep import prices low on essential inputs and investment goods, so import-competing 
food crops had to be subsidized to keep (urban) food prices low. Difficulties in raising 
revenue domestically due to the subsistence nature of the agricultural sector, which 
provided livelihood for the majority of the population, also meant that governments felt a 
need to rely on agricultural export taxes and marketing boards. This combination of 
measures geared at promoting industrial protection and generating revenue from the 
agricultural sector clearly seemed to harm agriculture. Rectifying this bias came in focus 









With a view to quantifying the impact of trade policies on relative agricultural price 
incentives Krueger and her colleagues initiated a number of influential studies of a 
representative group of 18 developing countries.
1 They distinguished between direct and 
indirect trade policy measures affecting agricultural price incentives. Direct trade policy 
measures were defined to include all measures, which affected the wedge between 
agricultural producer and border prices directly. These measures typically included 
domestic agricultural taxes and subsidies, export taxes on cash crops, and import tariffs 
on food crops. In contrast, indirect trade policy measures were defined as economy-wide 
measures, affecting the difference between relative agricultural producer and border 
prices. Indirect measures came under two main headings, including (i) industrial 
protection policies, and (ii) overvaluation of the exchange rate. The former group of 
industrial protection measures typically included industrial import tariffs and quotas, as 
well as domestic industrial taxes and subsidies. The overvaluation of the exchange rate 
was measured by the depreciation required to eliminate the non-sustainable part of the 
current account deficit in addition to the exchange rate impact of other trade policy 
interventions. 
 
The quantification of direct and indirect effects of domestic tax and trade policies on 
agricultural price incentives was primarily based on the computation of nominal 
protection rates (NPRs). The total NPR for a given traded agricultural product was 
defined as the proportional difference between (i) the ratio of the agricultural producer 
price and a non-agricultural producer price index, and (ii) the ratio between the 
agricultural border price and a non-agricultural border price index, both measured at the 
equilibrium exchange rate. Subsequently, the total NPR was additively decomposed into 
(i) a direct NPR measuring the impact on relative prices of differences between 
agricultural producer and border prices measured at the current exchange rate, and (ii) an 
indirect NPR measuring the impact on relative prices of differences between non-
agricultural producer and border prices, and the impact of exchange rate overvaluation. 
 
The study by KSV, which covered the period 1975-84, presented NPRs for one 
agricultural tradable from each of the 18 countries in their sample. The results indicated 
that exported agricultural products suffered from both direct and indirect nominal 
protection. Using simple averages, KSV found that agricultural export goods suffered 
from a negative direct NPR of -11 percent, while import-competing agricultural goods 
benefited from a positive direct NPR of around 20 percent. Nevertheless, KSV also found 
that the direct NPRs were swamped by the economy-wide indirect NPRs, averaging ￿27 
percent. Accordingly, the KSV study concluded that indirect effects dominated direct 
effects and that total nominal protection was, on average, negative for all types of traded 
agricultural goods. While KSV used nominal protection as their measure of relative price 
distortion, they acknowledged that a more appropriate measure would be the so-called 
Effective Rate of Protection (ERP), which also takes distortions in input prices into 
account. However, ￿Due mainly to data inadequacy￿￿ the study by KSV contains no 
results on ERPs. 
 
The SV study covered the same sample of 18 countries, but extended the period of 
coverage to 1960-84 and generalized the results by extending the coverage of agricultural 
                                                 
1 Krueger, Schiff and ValdØs (1988), and Schiff and ValdØs (1992) will henceforth be referred to as KSV 








goods. Accordingly, SV reported average agricultural NPRs, which were based on 
￿￿four to six agricultural commodities, and that coverage typically represented between 
40 and 80 percent of net agricultural product￿. Their results were qualitatively similar to 
those of KSV. They confirmed that agricultural exports and imports faced NPRs of 
respectively ￿13 percent and 14 percent, on average; and that these direct effects were 
dominated by indirect NPRs, averaging ￿22 percent. Moreover, SV reasserted the 
conclusion arrived at by KSV that total nominal protection was on average negative for 
all types of traded agricultural goods. The SV study also found that the nominal 
disprotection of traded agricultural goods increased over time, and that ￿￿industrial 
protection has penalized agriculture more than overvaluation of the exchange rate in two-
thirds of the countries examined￿.
2  
 
Based on the assumption that all agricultural goods are traded, KSV and SV argued that 
their results (for the chosen set of goods) were representative for the overall agricultural 
sector. The SV study did recognize that ￿￿traded products have non-tradable 
components, including some distribution and marketing costs.￿ Yet, no attempt was made 
to take account of these non-tradable components of domestic agricultural production, 
and the same goes for their underlying causes in the form of marketing costs and 
qualitative differences from world market goods. Perfect substitution between domestic 
and world market goods was assumed. Moreover, KSV and SV ignored general 
equilibrium effects. 
 
In contrast, the current study considers imperfect substitution between domestic and 
world market goods as well as general equilibrium effects. The computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) framework allows direct computation of value added prices under 
various policy scenarios, which measure resource pulls in factor markets and provide a 




3. Country Models and Data Sets 
 
The analysis is based on a ￿standard￿ trade-focused computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model along the lines used in Arndt, Jensen, Robinson, and Tarp (2000) and fully 
described in L￿fgren et al. (2001). The model is applied to each of the sample countries 
with almost no differences in model specification across the countries. The applications 
are necessarily somewhat stylized in order to achieve comparability, neglecting country-
specific institutional details while capturing the wide differences in country data. 
References to more detailed case studies of all the countries in the sample are provided in 
the references section below. The few cases where country-specific behavior has been 
imposed on the model are duly noted.  
 
The model specifies a two-level nesting structure for the production function, where the 
bottom nest uses a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function to aggregate 
primary factors in the production of value added, while the top nest uses a Leontief 
function to combine the value added aggregate with inputs of intermediate goods. On the 
                                                 
2 NPRs are further discussed in Table 5 below. 
3 The implications of assuming imperfect ￿tradability￿ for the use of the ERP measure are explored in 
Devarajan and Sussangkarn, 1992, and de Melo and Robinson, 1981. Comparison with partial-equilibrium 








consumption side, the model relies on a Stone-Geary utility function specification, which 
yields a Linear Expenditure System (LES) with constant marginal propensities to 
consume, over and above a set of minimum consumption-levels. In terms of trade with 
the rest of the world, a Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) function is used to 
transform domestic production into respectively exports and domestically marketed 
production, while an Armington (CES) specification is used to aggregate domestically 
marketed production and imports into domestic consumer goods. 
 
The model also allows for the modeling of marketing margins and home consumption of 
own production. Marketing margins are modeled as a sector, which buys marketing 
services from other production sectors, e.g. transport services, and sells them as a 
combined commodity. In this way, marketing margins are modeled as intermediate inputs 
in the production of marketed goods. The model allows for separate marketing margins 
for imports, exports, and domestically marketed production. Home consumption of own 
production is modeled by including home-consumed goods in the LES expenditure 
system. Accordingly, the LES expenditure system specify the allocation of 
supernumerary income, over and above minimum consumption expenditures, between 
home consumption, evaluated at producer prices, and marketed consumption, evaluated 
at market prices. 
 
The data set consists of Social Accounting Matrices (SAM) for the 15 countries listed in 
Table 1. All SAM data sets are from the 1990s and include significant agricultural detail. 
The sample includes upper middle-income and high-income countries such as Argentina, 
Brazil, Korea, and Mexico, and lower middle-income and low-income countries such as 
Costa Rica, Egypt, Indonesia, Malawi, Morocco, Mozambique, Tanzania, Tunisia, 
Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The sample countries are geographically dispersed, 
including five countries from Southern Africa, three from Northern Africa, five from 
Latin America, and two from Asia. There is an overlap of six countries (Argentina, 
Brazil, Egypt, Korea, Morocco, and Zambia) with the sample used in Krueger, Schiff, 
and ValdØs (1988), and Schiff and ValdØs (1992). 
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
The 15 SAM data sets differ in a couple of important dimensions, including (i) the 
disaggregation of production sectors, (ii) the disaggregation of primary factors of 
production, and (iii) the inclusion of marketing costs and home consumption of own 
production. The disaggregation of production sectors and production factors can be 
gauged from Table 1. The Tunisian data set is the least disaggregated in our sample with 
only 19 production sectors and only two agricultural sectors, while the Mexican data set, 
at the other extreme, accounts for 71 production sectors of which 57 sectors are 
agriculturally related. The disaggregation of factors also varies among the SAMs. Three 
country data sets, including Argentina, Korea and Venezuela, specify only three factors 
of production, while Brazil and Mexico include respectively 39 and 45 different factors. 
All data sets account separately for value added by labor and capital, but nine data sets, 
including Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Malawi, Mexico, Morocco, Tanzania, Zambia, and 








simulations comparable across countries, capital was disaggregated into agricultural and 
non-agricultural capital so as to create agricultural-specific production factors in all 
country models. Apart from being a reasonable assumption for the current type of 
medium-term simulations, it has the added benefit of making our factor market closure 
comparable to the KSV and SV studies. Accordingly, this closure rule allows us to focus 
attention on the tradability assumptions underlying the KSV and SV results.
4 
 
Another difference among the country data sets is whether marketing margins and home 
consumption are taken into account. Marketing margins are included in the data sets for 
Indonesia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Tunisia, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, while 
home consumption is included in the data sets for Mexico, Mozambique, Tanzania, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Only the four southern African countries include both marketing 
costs and home consumption of own production. 
 
The economic structure of the 15 country models can be seen in Table 2. The countries 
differ widely according to the importance of the agricultural sector. Poorer southern 
African countries like Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia are very dependent 
on agricultural production, while countries like Costa Rica and Zimbabwe have smaller 
and more specialized agricultural sectors. In contrast, more developed middle- and high-
income countries like Argentina, Brazil, Korea, Mexico, and Venezuela have much 
smaller agricultural sectors, whereas northern African countries like Egypt, Morocco, and 
Tunisia, as well as Indonesia in Asia, have moderately large agricultural sectors. 
 
[Table 2 around here] 
 
In the sample, the degree of dependence on trade in agricultural goods is unrelated to the 
relative size of the agricultural sector. Among the five countries with relatively high 
agricultural export shares, Argentina and Mexico are upper middle-income countries with 
small agricultural sectors; Costa Rica and Zimbabwe are lower-middle income and low-
income countries with partly developed and moderately large agricultural sectors; and 
Malawi is a low-income country with a very large agricultural sector. Nevertheless, each 
of these countries has agricultural export shares that are significantly larger than their 
average non-agricultural trade shares. Among the remaining 10 countries in the sample, 
there are six countries, including the three northern African countries, as well as Korea, 
Venezuela, and Mozambique, which have relatively high agricultural import shares. Yet, 
these countries have even higher non-agricultural trade shares. Finally, among the four 
countries with low agricultural trade shares, Tanzania, Zambia, and Indonesia have high 
non-agricultural trade shares, while Brazil is a relatively closed economy with low 
overall trade shares. 
 
Seven of the country data sets include information on marketing margins, as shown in 
Table 3. Marketing accounts for 15-25 percent of total costs in the agricultural sectors, 
except Tanzania where it is close to 50 percent. The industrial sectors tend to have higher 
                                                 
4 The fisheries sector was inconsistently defined among the various SAM data sets. It is defined as an 
agricultural sector in Indonesia, Malawi, Mexico, Tanzania, and Zambia, and as an industry sector in 
Mozambique. In the Argentina, Korea, Morocco, Tunisia and Venezuela models, the fisheries sector was 
defined as an agricultural sector even though it used both agricultural and non-agricultural production 
factors. Finally, fishery was not defined as a separate production sector in the Brazil, Costa Rica, and Egypt 








shares of marketing costs, but, a major part of the marketing costs in industry stem from 
marketing large quantities of industrial imports. Marketing margins on agricultural and 
industrial imports are similar, but marketing margins are much higher for industrial 
commodities sold on the domestic market or exported. The only major exception is 
Venezuela, which has very high agricultural import marketing margin rates. In general, 
the structure of marketing margin rates seems to provide another incentive bias against 
domestic agricultural production. Accordingly, when the price of marketing services 
increase, this will tend to increase industrial protection afforded by relatively high 
industrial import margin rates, and decrease relative agricultural price incentives by 
increasing agricultural marketing costs.
5 
 
[Table 3 around here] 
 
From the structure of domestic and trade policy taxes and tariffs, presented in Table 5, it 
follows that export taxes (te) are virtually non-existent. Costa Rica has some dispersion 
of export tax rates due to high industrial export subsidies, but otherwise (small) export 
taxes are only observed in Mozambique and Malawi. In contrast, the data indicate that 
many countries still rely on relatively high protective import tariffs (tm). This partly 
reflects that governments have relatively easy access to tax revenue from this source. 
Industrial tariff rates are generally higher than agricultural tariff rates, with a few major 
exceptions, including Korea, Morocco, and Venezuela, which maintain high protective 
agricultural tariffs. The dispersion of tariff rates, measured by the standard deviation 
across sectors, is relatively high for five countries, including the three northern African 
countries, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, as well as Indonesia and Zimbabwe. The lowest 
average tariff rates are observed for the relatively open economy of Mexico, while the 
highest average tariff rates are observed for Morocco and Zimbabwe. 
 
[Table 4 around here] 
 
The structure of domestic trade policy taxes is contrasted with NPRs in Table 4, for the 
six countries (Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Korea, Morocco, and Zambia) that overlap with 
the sample used in KSV and SV.
6 The direct NPRs from the SV study indicate that there 
was direct nominal dis-protection (domestic prices below world prices) in Argentina, 
Egypt, Korea, and Zambia during 1960-84. These changed to direct tariff protection for 
agriculture in our sample period. Direct nominal protection of agriculture also increased 
strongly in Morocco, while it decreased marginally in the case of Brazil. A comparison 
between non-agricultural import tariffs and indirect NPRs are difficult, since NPRs 
include exchange rate effects. Nevertheless, the SV study (page 16) asserts that 
￿￿industrial protection policies￿had a greater effect on the indirect tax than did 
overvaluation of the real exchange rate.￿ Under this assumption, the data indicate 
reduction in protection of nonagricultural products in this period. Moreover, structural 
adjustment programs are likely to have reduced the impact of exchange rate effects, 
implying a decrease in indirect nominal protection of agriculture between 1960-84 and 
                                                 
5 Large production and export shares of services, which in general do not incur marketing costs, lower 
average non-agricultural marketing costs and reinforce the agricultural bias implied by the structure of 
marketing costs. In contrast, moderate import shares for services lower average non-agricultural protection 
rates and the implied agricultural bias. The Zambian data set is unusual, in the sense that service sectors 
such as energy and construction incur marketing costs. 
6 Only import tariffs are tabulated in Table 4 since export taxes are absent for these six countries. Nominal 








our sample period. Altogether, the data indicate that nominal dis-protection of agriculture 
declined in this period.  
 
[Table 5 around here] 
 
Domestic indirect taxes are generally much smaller than tariff rates. The biggest 
dispersion as regards production taxes (ta) is found in the well-developed Korean 
economy, but dispersion is also high in Brazil, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Average 
production tax rates indicate that Brazilian and Zambian agricultural production is taxed 
significantly less than non-agricultural production, while Korean agricultural production 
is strongly subsidized. In addition, a number of countries, including Egypt, Mexico, 
Morocco, and Venezuela have zero tax rates on agricultural production. Looking at 
consumption tax rates (tq), there are three country data sets, including Brazil, Korea, and 
Zimbabwe, which exclude this kind of taxes. Consumption tax rates are heavily dispersed 
in Egypt, and to a lesser degree in Costa Rica and Zambia. Dispersion of consumption 
taxes is also high in Tanzania where marketed food crops are strongly subsidized. 
Average consumption tax rates diverge in Morocco and Venezuela, as well as in poorer 
southern African countries such as Malawi, Mozambique, and Tanzania. 
 
Altogether, judging from the structural characteristics of the countries included in the 
sample, they represent a heterogeneous group. The sample certainly provides a 
satisfactory degree of variation in the level of economic development, geographical 
location, and economic trade and tax structures for a comparative analysis of agricultural 
bias. We now turn to the results of the various simulations. 
 
 
4. Simulation Results 
 
This section presents two sets of simulations. Section 4.1 includes simulations to measure 
the level of agricultural bias in the sample countries. This set includes simulations to 
measure the impact of tax and tariff structures as well as the impact of eliminating current 
account deficits and surpluses and the resulting appreciation/depreciation of the exchange 
rate. Subsequently, Section 4.2 presents two groups of simulations along the lines of the 
single country-studies in Bautista et al. (2001) and Jensen and Tarp (2002) to assess the 
possible price incentive effects of a set of stylized ISI-type trade policies. The impact on 
relative price incentives is measured by the proportional difference between (i) an 
agricultural value added price index, and (ii) a non-agricultural value added price index. 
The price of value added (PVA) measures relative price incentives in factor markets, and 
is therefore equivalent to the Effective Rate of Protection (ERP) discussed in Section 2. 
 
All simulations in Section 4 are carried out using a macro closure in which aggregate 
investment is specified as a fixed share of total absorption. This simple specification of 
macro closure assumes no major swings in macro aggregates in response to external 
shocks, and focuses attention on the tradability assumptions underlying the studies by 
KSV and SV. To maintain investment as a fixed share of nominal absorption, household 








finance literature, all simulations were carried out using a revenue-neutral specification of 
the government budget. In order to fix government revenue, household tax rates, which 
are treated as lump-sum taxes in the model, were also allowed to vary proportionately. 
The factor market closure specifies full employment of available factor supplies. 
Furthermore, all simulations were carried out specifying a flexible real exchange rate and 
fixed foreign savings, except for the set of exchange rate simulations in Section 4.2, 
where the impact of pre-set exchange rate appreciation and depreciation are analyzed. 
Finally, all simulations in Section 4.2 were carried out from a base run where all indirect 
taxes were reduced to zero and replaced by proportional increases in household income 
tax rates, providing a distortion-free base. 
 
4.1 Agricultural bias in the 1990s 
 
Tax and tariff simulations 
 
The first set of five tax and tariff simulations includes a base run (Simulation 1) and four 
alternative scenarios that cumulatively eliminate production taxes/subsidies (Simulation 
2), consumption taxes/subsidies (Simulation 3), export taxes/subsidies (Simulation 4), 
and import tariffs (Simulation 5). The results presented in Table 6 indicate that the 
empirical tax structure of the 15 countries in our sample show few signs of biasing price 
incentives against agricultural production. In fact, Malawi stands out as a special case, 
since the indirect tax structure discriminates significantly against agricultural production. 
Looking at the Malawian tax structure, it is mainly the structure of consumption taxes 
that creates this bias. The major share of consumption tax revenue is derived from 
processed food, which indirectly taxes primary agricultural inputs.  
 
This outcome has to be seen in the context of the particular geographical and political 
circumstances in Malawi. Malawi is a small, poor, densely populated country where 
agriculture is organized around large-scale units and where marketing is closely 
controlled. This structure permits the government to extract rents by indirect taxation of 
food processing industries. In addition, Malawi is the only country in the sample, where 
the government is discriminating against agricultural exports, implying that the tax 
structure discriminates against agricultural production at all levels, with an implicit level 
of discrimination of eight percent. 
 
[Table 6 around here] 
 
At the other extreme, the tax structure in Morocco implies considerable protection of 
agricultural production. Table 6 demonstrates that the whole Moroccan tax structure, 
including production and consumption taxes, but especially import tariffs, contributes to 
biasing price incentives in favor of agricultural production. The reason is to be found in 
the highly dispersed tariff structure, where very high tariffs protect domestic agricultural 
production sectors, including wheat and livestock, while high tariffs on manufactured 
imports tax domestic manufacturing sectors by increasing their input costs. Moreover, 
since domestic production and consumption taxes do not apply to agricultural production, 









Among the remaining 13 countries, three groups with broadly similar characteristics can 
be discerned. The first group, including Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, and Zimbabwe, 
has tax structures, which are relatively neutral with respect to relative price incentives. 
Argentina and Brazil are upper middle-income countries with developed and competitive 
agricultural sectors, specialized in livestock and cash crops, while the other two, Costa 
Rica and Zimbabwe, have competitive agricultural export sectors that are large-scale in 
nature and specialized in the production of cash crops, such as tobacco and cotton in the 
case of Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, taxation of agricultural production remains relatively 
moderate in these countries. This implies that it is the structure of non-agricultural 
indirect taxation that keeps production incentives relatively undistorted. In general, 
domestic indirect taxes tend to support relative agricultural price incentives, while import 
tariffs tend to protect non-agricultural production in this group of countries. 
 
The second group, including Egypt, Korea, Tunisia, and Venezuela, has economic 
structures that are similar to that of Morocco. These countries have relatively small 
agricultural sectors that are insufficient to feed their populations, so they are dependent 
on imports of agricultural goods. In order to maintain some level of self-sufficiency, 
these countries tend to impose tax-structures that favor agricultural production. In spite of 
their similarities, they differ from Morocco in their approaches to supporting agricultural 
price incentives. While Morocco relies strongly on agricultural import tariffs (e.g., to 
protect production of soft wheat), Korea relies more heavily on domestic differences 
between non-agricultural taxation and agricultural subsidization to generate price 
incentives in favor of agriculture (e.g., rice). Accordingly, the level of agricultural 
protection varies from seven percent in Venezuela and 17 percent in Korea, to between 
11 and 32 percent in the northern African group of countries, including Egypt, Tunisia, 
and Morocco. 
 
The third group consists of Indonesia and three poorer southern African countries, 
including Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia. They can be characterized as low-income 
countries with relatively large but underdeveloped agricultural sectors. Accordingly, 
trade in agricultural goods is generally small, except in Mozambique, where regional 
differences in land fertility and agricultural demand, in addition to recurring natural 
calamities, imply that agricultural imports remain moderately high from time to time. 
Nevertheless, the relatively large size and underdeveloped nature of the agricultural 
sector in these countries make taxation of non-agricultural commodities the only viable 
means of raising tax revenue. Tariff structures, in particular, tend to be skewed towards 
taxation of non-agricultural imports. Since agricultural production technologies are very 
rudimentary while non-agricultural production technologies are more input-intensive, this 
tends to lower non-agricultural price incentives by increasing intermediate input costs. 
Combined with non-agricultural production and consumption taxes which lower producer 
prices, the tax structure of these countries discriminates against non-agricultural 
production on all levels. The implicit level of agricultural protection ranges from three 
percent in Indonesia, to 6-13 percent in the two southern African countries. 
 








relative price incentives. While Mexico has one of the most open economies in our 
sample, it has a relatively uniform and non-distorting structure of import tariffs, as well 
as a relatively balanced trade account in both agricultural and non-agricultural goods. 
This structure implies that Mexico maintains a relatively neutral foreign trade regime. In 
line with Korea, Mexico relies on domestic differences between indirect non-agricultural 
taxes and (small) agricultural subsidies to yield relative price incentives in favor of 
agricultural production, resulting in an implicit level of agricultural price support of six 
percent. 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the results of the empirical tax and tariff simulations. It maps 
relative value added prices against the relative dispersion of taxes and tariff rates, as 
measured by the ratio between the coefficients of variation of relative agricultural vs. 
non-agricultural tax and tariff rates. The figure shows that any structural relationship 
between relative price incentives and the relative dispersion of tax and tariff rates is 
dominated by other factors. A comparison of a few selected countries makes this point 
clear. Low rates of relative dispersion in the order of 0.5-0.7 accompany protection for 
agricultural production in Indonesia, Mozambique, Tunisia, Venezuela, and Zambia. 
However, huge import tariffs and production subsidies also benefit agriculture in 
Morocco and Korea, even though the dispersion of agricultural tax and tariff rates is 1.8-
1.9 times the dispersion of non-agricultural tax and tariff rates. Absolute differences in 
average taxes and tariffs account better for the variation in results. The spread between 
average levels of agricultural and non-agricultural production and consumption taxes are 
typically negative, and generally leads to proportional increases in relative agricultural 
value added prices. Malawi is special since a negative three percent average differential 
in consumption taxes leads to a seven percent decline in relative agricultural price 
incentives. This is, however, as argued above, due to strong taxation of food processing 
industries, which implicitly taxes agricultural production. 
  
[Figure 1 around here] 
 
Figure 2 maps the impact of the tariff rate structures on relative agricultural value added 
prices against absolute differences in tariff rates. Import tariffs have the twin impact of 
increasing input costs and protecting producer prices, and the dominating channel 
determines the sign of the impact on relative price incentives. Among the countries that 
have maintained a negative differential, there are five where the input cost channel 
clearly dominated (Egypt, Indonesia, Mozambique, Tunisia, and Zambia), while there are 
four where the protective channel dominated (Argentina, Brazil, Malawi and Zimbabwe). 
The former group of countries tends to have underdeveloped agricultural sectors and to 
rely on import tariffs as a source of government revenue. In contrast, the latter group 
tends to have relatively developed agricultural sectors and to rely on import tariffs to 
protect non-agricultural production. Costa Rica is a borderline case where tariffs are flat 
on average, but where the tariff structure, nevertheless, tends to favor non-agricultural 
production, since non-agricultural tariffs are relatively dispersed. Finally, a group of 
countries, including food-importers like Korea, Morocco, and Venezuela, has opted to 










[Figure 2 around here] 
 
To summarize, in our sample of fifteen countries, the structure of indirect taxes generates 
a significant policy bias against agriculture in only one country (Malawi). For the others, 
five have very lo biases either way (less than – 3 percent), four have moderate biases in 
favor of agriculture (5 ￿ 10 percent), and five subsidize agriculture significantly (11 ￿ 30 
percent). The impact of indirect tax structures on relative price incentives is relatively 
neutral in the countries with developed and internationally competitive agricultural 
sectors. A moderate bias against non-agricultural production, and hence in favor of 
agriculture, was found in poorer southern African countries with underdeveloped 
agricultural sectors where indirect taxes on non-agricultural commodities are the main 
source of government tax revenue. High levels of agricultural protection characterize the 
northern African countries and countries like Korea and Venezuela. Korea directly 
subsidizes agricultural production while Morocco imposes high agricultural import 
tariffs. 
  
The analyses of tax structures further indicate that some countries, including Costa Rica, 
have used dispersed tax and tariff structures to favor agricultural or non-agricultural 
production. Nevertheless, most countries simply maintained relatively high non-
agricultural production and consumption taxes to improve relative agricultural price 
incentives. In addition, most developing countries in our sample tended to maintain a 
negative differential between agricultural and non-agricultural import tariffs. Around half 
of these countries used high non-agricultural tariffs to improve agricultural price 
incentives and raise government revenue, while the other half used the negative 
differential to protect non-agricultural production and tax agricultural production, 
implicitly. Finally, a number of food-importing countries opted to maintain high strategic 
agricultural tariff rates for the sole purpose of protecting agricultural production. 
 
Current account simulations 
 
The second set of six current account simulations include a gradual reduction of foreign 
savings inflows as a share of aggregate absorption in steps of 20 percent of the initial 
share. The set-up mirrors that of the World Bank studies by Anne Krueger and her 
collaborators. They relied on estimates of sustainable current account deficits to derive 
needed reductions in foreign savings inflows. The reductions in foreign savings inflows 
are accompanied by changes to the exchange rates. The appreciation or depreciation of 
the exchange rates proves to be very important for relative price incentives. By reducing 
foreign savings inflows in 20 percent steps, we sidestep the issue of deciding on the size 
of a sustainable current account deficit. Nevertheless, differences in the size and direction 
of impact on relative price incentive indicate that exchange rate appreciation in a general 
equilibrium setting does not always generate a price incentive bias against agriculture. 
 
Table 7 indicates that the size and sign of the current account differed strongly between 
the countries in our sample during the 1990s. Among the group of Latin American 








moderate current account deficits, while Venezuela ran a very large current account 
surplus. Among the group of northern African countries, Morocco and Tunisia ran small 
current account deficits, while Egypt ran a small surplus. In contrast, the group of 
southern African countries generally ran very large current account deficits. Indonesia 




[Table 7 around here] 
 
Table 8 indicates that changes in the current account translate into widely different real 
exchange rate changes. Comparing Latin American countries to each other, it becomes 
clear that implicit appreciation of the real exchange rate has been much larger in 
relatively closed economies with small current account deficits such as Argentina and 
Brazil than in more open economies with larger current account deficits like Costa Rica 
and Mexico. A large current account surplus in the moderately open economy of 
Venezuela has been accompanied by a large induced depreciation of the exchange rate, 
while a smaller current account surplus in the less open economy of Egypt implied more 
moderate exchange rate depreciation. Finally, current account deficits in the remaining 
African and Asian countries have been accompanied by exchange rate appreciation of 
varying sizes. 
 
[Table 8 around here] 
 
While the elimination of current account deficits indicates induced real exchange rate 
appreciation in 12 of the 15 countries in our sample, the impact of such appreciation 
clearly has had differing effects on relative agricultural price incentives depending on 
specific country circumstances. Elimination of current account deficits and resulting 
exchange rate depreciation improve agricultural price incentives significantly in five 
countries: Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Malawi, and Zimbabwe. A common 
characteristic among four of these five countries is that they have relatively large 
agricultural trade shares. Exchange rate appreciation therefore had a relatively strong 
negative impact on domestic agricultural prices. In addition, relative agricultural price 
incentives have suffered from a strong exchange rate appreciation in the relatively closed 
economy of Brazil. The appreciation tended to protect non-agricultural production sectors 
by lowering their relative input costs. 
 
On the other hand, elimination of current account deficits and resulting real exchange rate 
depreciation worsen relative agricultural price incentives in five other countries with very 
small agricultural trade shares, including poorer southern African countries with 
underdeveloped agricultural sectors (Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia), as well as 
Indonesia where agricultural production is virtually non-traded, and Tunisia with a 
relatively developed non-agricultural trade sector.
8 Finally, country specific 
circumstances and the small degree of overvaluation in Morocco and Mexico mean that 
relative agricultural price incentives have been little affected. In the case of Morocco, the 
seemingly unchanged relative agricultural price incentives result from the fact that the 
                                                 
7 Only countries with a current account balance different from zero will be discussed in what follows. 
8 The case of Indonesia is more complicated since it is a major producer and consumer of rice. In this 
period, Indonesia was largely self-sufficient in rice while government controlled international trade in rice 








impact of declining non-agricultural terms-of-trade are evened out by the impact of 
declining non-agricultural input costs. 
 
Turning to Egypt and Venezuela, which both ran current account surpluses, the results 
indicate that elimination of the current account surpluses and resulting exchange rate 
appreciation improve relative agricultural price incentives significantly. While each of 
these countries are traditional food importers with little agricultural exports, both 
countries have relatively developed non-agricultural export sectors such as oil and gas, 
and tourism services. The elimination of undervaluation in these countries will therefore 
have a strong negative impact on non-agricultural terms-of-trade, favoring agriculture.
9 
 
Figure 3 illustrates how current account deficits and surpluses induce exchange rate 
appreciation and depreciation, respectively. Current account surpluses induced exchange 
rate depreciation in Egypt and Venezuela, while current account deficits induced 
exchange rate appreciation in all other countries. Looking at the group of countries with 
current account deficits, the induced level of exchange rate appreciation clearly depends 
on country specific characteristics. On the one hand, current account deficits in Argentina 
and Brazil, in the order of 2.4-2.7 percent of absorption, induced exchange rate 
appreciation in the order of 13-19 percent. On the other hand, a current account deficit of 
19 percent of absorption in Mozambique was accompanied by a mere 10 percent 
exchange rate appreciation. 
 
[Figure 3 around here] 
 
The impact of induced exchange rate changes on relative agricultural price incentives is 
presented in Figure 4. There is a lot of variety of responses. Induced real exchange rate 
depreciation favored non-agricultural production in Egypt and Venezuela and 
appreciation favored agriculture in Mozambique, Indonesia, Tanzania, Zambia, and 
Tunisia. In contrast, induced real exchange rate appreciation mainly worsened 
agricultural price incentives in Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Malawi, and Zimbabwe. 
The differing relative impact of elimination of trade deficits (or surpluses) on agriculture 
versus industry depends on relative trade shares and on relative elasticities of import 
demand and export supply.
10 To see this relationship, Figure 5 plots the impact of 
eliminating current account deficits and surpluses on relative price incentives against the 
ratio of agricultural vs. non-agricultural trade shares. 
 
[Figures 4 and 5 around here] 
 
Exchange rate appreciation generally works to (i) lower terms-of-trade for export goods, 
(ii) lower protection for import-competing goods, and (iii) lower input costs for 
production sectors using imported inputs. In most of our sample countries, the combined 
impact of the terms-of-trade and protection channels dominated the input-cost channel. 
This implies that exchange rate appreciation generally worsens relative price incentives 
                                                 
9 In the case of Venezuela, the assumption that the existence of a surplus indicates undervaluation ignores 
the Dutch-disease effect of oil exports on the real exchange over a long period, which has hurt tradable 
agriculture. Zambia has had a similar Dutch-disease problem, which may explain its low share of tradable 
agriculture (L￿fgren, Robinson, and Thurlow, 2002.  
10 Again note the case of Indonesia where rice is important, but with a small trade share. In Indonesia, 
appreciation would hurt domestic rice producers, but the government insulated them using direct import 








for the most intensively traded sector, while exchange rate depreciation generally 
improves relative price incentives for the most intensively traded sector. Abstracting from 
Egypt and Venezuela, figure 5 shows a clear negative relationship between agricultural 
trade shares and the impact of induced exchange rate appreciation on relative agricultural 
price incentives. Accordingly, relative agricultural price incentives have generally 
improved in countries with low relative agricultural trade shares and worsened in 
countries with high agricultural trade shares. Relative agricultural price incentives also 
worsened in Egypt and Venezuela, since induced exchange rate depreciation benefited 
highly traded non-agricultural sectors. The main exception from the general rule is Brazil 
where a 19 percent induced exchange rate appreciation lead to a seven percent worsening 
of relative agricultural price incentives, even though the relative agricultural trade share 
was only 60 percent. As mentioned above, the exchange rate appreciation mainly served 
to lower non-agricultural input costs in Brazil. 
 
Overall, the current account simulations indicate that there is bias against agriculture 
arising from the exchange rate in seven (five appreciated, two depreciated) of our fifteen 
sample countries: Egypt, Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Malawi, Venezuela, and 
Zimbabwe. In five, the bias is in favor of agriculture: Indonesia, Mozambique, Tanzania, 
Tunisia, and Zambia. In the remaining three, the bias is negligible: Korea, Mexico, and 
Morocco. The assessment of overvalued exchange rates has to be based on some measure 
of the ￿sustainability￿ of the current account. Assuming zero as the proper level of 
current account sustainability, the combination of both indirect tax and exchange rate 
policies has induced a significant agricultural bias against agriculture in seven countries, 
and favored agriculture in eight. If a current account deficit of three percent of absorption 
is considered to be the proper level of sustainability instead, Table 8 indicates current 
account deficits only induce a bias against agriculture on the order of 3 ￿ 5 percent for 
Costa Rica, Malawi, and Zimbabwe. Taken together with the impact of tax-structures in 
Table 7, this implies that a significant agricultural price incentive bias of 6 ￿ 12 percent 
would only have been present in two sample countries, Malawi and Zimbabwe. 
Consistent with earlier work, we find that the exchange rate has a strong effect on relative 
price incentives facing tradable goods, including tradable agriculture, and exchange rate 
swings often dominate any changes in indirect taxes.  
Section 4.2. Traditional ISI-policies 
 
Traditional Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) policies were used extensively in 
developing countries throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s. Core elements of this 
strategy included an overvalued exchange rate as well as tariffs on non-agricultural 
imports to protect domestic non-agricultural production, and agricultural export taxes to 
raise revenue from the agricultural sector. In this section, we investigate the impact of 
each of these ISI-type policies on relative agricultural price incentives, by imposing a set 
of stylized tax and exchange rate policies on our sample of 15 single-country CGE 
models.  
 
Agricultural Export Tax and Non-Agricultural Import Tariff Simulations 
 








exports and a uniform 25 percent tariff on non-agricultural imports. Results are presented 
in Table 9, including changes in relative value added prices (PVA) and changes in 
relative value added quantities (QVA). The assumption of agriculture-specific factors in 
each country model implies that inter-sectoral quantity changes between agricultural and 
non-agricultural production sectors are in most cases minor. The results indicate that non-
agricultural import tariffs can both worsen and improve relative agricultural value added 
prices depending on the structural characteristics of the economy. The biggest relative 
price increases occur in Tunisia, Mozambique, and Mexico, where relative agricultural 
value added prices improve by 10 ￿ 16 percent. In contrast, the strongest relative price 
declines occur in Argentina, Costa Rica, and Malawi, where relative agricultural value 
added prices drop by 7 ￿ 17 percent. These results indicate that non-agricultural import 
tariffs do not necessarily provide relative protection for domestic non-agricultural 
production sectors. 
 
[Table 9 around here] 
 
The relative impact of these ISI policies depends crucially on relative trade shares. The 
countries that experience the largest declines in relative agricultural value added prices 
(Argentina, Costa Rica, and Malawi) are those with the largest agricultural export shares 
and relative agricultural trade shares. The results indicate that pervasive tariff protection 
induces appreciation in the real exchange rate of 8 ￿ 11 percent in the three countries. 
Given high agricultural trade shares, the real appreciation leads to lower relative 
agricultural prices. Induced changes in input costs further reinforce the impact of the 
overvalued exchange rates. Production technologies employed in (some of the) 
agricultural sectors use relatively large quantities of marketed, import-intensive, non-
agricultural inputs such as chemicals. 
 
The countries, which experience the largest increases in relative agricultural value added 
prices include Tunisia, Mozambique, and Mexico. Interestingly, Mexico also has large 
agricultural trade shares, but non-agricultural import tariffs, nevertheless, raise relative 
agricultural price incentives. A key reason for this result is that Mexican imports consist 
mainly of intermediate and capital goods for further processing, where possibilities for 
import substitution are limited. The high import content of exports leads to a 
counterintuitive result: general protection of industrial imports hurts exports and leads to 
a small depreciation of the real exchange rate. The result is a slight improvement in 
relative agricultural value added prices. 
 
Mozambique and Tunisia also experience large increases in relative agricultural value 
added prices, but in contrast to Mexico, they have low agricultural export shares. Both 
countries experience an eight percent tariff-induced appreciation of the real exchange 
rate. The combination of low agricultural trade shares and exchange rate appreciation 
works to improve relative agricultural price incentives. Tariff-induced increases in non-
agricultural input costs also work to improve relative agricultural price incentives. 
Finally, prices on marketing services decline in both countries by 8 ￿ 11 percent, due to 
declining demand for marketed goods, ;which reduces the demand for marketing 
services.
11 
                                                 
11 The marketing margin rates presented in Table 3 indicate that services do not incur marketing margins in 
Mozambique. It follows that average margin rates for marketed agricultural goods are significantly higher 









The combination of non-agricultural import tariffs and induced exchange rate 
appreciation in the range of 5 ￿ 11 percent have more moderate effects on relative price 
incentives for the remaining group of countries, including Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, 
Korea, Morocco, Tanzania, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Relative agricultural 
prices improve in five countries (Egypt, Indonesia, Korea, Tanzania, and Zambia) where 
agricultural exports are generally small and where agricultural imports typically come in 
the form of primary crops for which there is little or no domestic production and 
therefore little possibility for substitution. The relatively small agricultural trade shares 
mean that agricultural production is shielded from the exchange rate-induced 
disprotection of import-competing sectors, and declining terms of trade for export 
sectors. The accompanying reallocation of production factors among non-agricultural 
production sectors tend to benefit largely non-traded food-processing sectors, and lead to 
increasing producer prices in the equally non-traded agricultural sectors. Tariff-induced 
increases in non-agricultural input-costs further add to the increasing relative agricultural 
price incentives. 
 
In contrast, exchange rate appreciation in Zimbabwe works to lower relative value added 
prices for both small- and large-scale farmers, given large agricultural exports of cotton 
from small-scale farmers and of tobacco from large-scale farmers. The case of Brazil is 
special, since it is the only country where relative agricultural prices decrease in an 
environment where agricultural trade shares are small. However, tariff-induced real 
exchange rate appreciation lowers the terms-of-trade for processed food exports, which 
spills over into the agricultural sector and lowers agricultural producer prices. Moreover, 
agricultural input costs are relatively sensitive to non-agricultural import tariffs in the 
relatively developed Brazilian agricultural sector. Increasing input costs therefore tend to 
lower relative agricultural value added prices even further. The exchange rate 
appreciation almost neutralizes or slightly dominates the protective impact of the tariffs 
in the two remaining countries, Morocco and Venezuela, leading to almost unchanged 
relative agricultural value added prices. While the main neutralizing impact of the 
overvalued exchange rate in Venezuela is to lower domestic export prices in natural 
resource sectors such as gas and petroleum, the main impact in Morocco is to lower 
export prices and hence the scope for import substitution in manufacturing and (tourism) 
services. 
 
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the impact of non-agricultural import tariffs on relative 
agricultural price incentives. Figure 6 presents the price incentive impact as a function of 
absolute non-agricultural import shares, and supports the argument that the impact of 
non-agricultural import tariffs on relative agricultural price incentives increases with the 
non-agricultural import share. This relationship indicates that general non-agricultural 
import tariffs do not lead to relative non-agricultural protection whenever there is a basis 
for import substituting policies. Nevertheless, the variation of the results for countries 
with non-agricultural import shares between 20-40 percent indicates that there are other 
important determinants. 
 









Figure 7 presents the impact of non-agricultural import tariffs as a function of relative 
trade shares. It indicates that the impact on relative agricultural price incentives is 
negatively related to the ratio of agricultural versus non-agricultural trade shares. This 
relationship points to the importance of accompanying tariff-induced exchange rate 
appreciation, which tends to worsen relative price incentives for the types of goods traded 
most intensively. The main outlier in Figure 7 is Mexico, where non-agricultural tariffs 
actually lead to exchange rate depreciation. Non-agricultural tariffs therefore benefit 
Mexican agriculture since the agricultural trade share is more than 1.5 times the non-
agricultural trade share. Overall, the stylized import tariff simulations indicate that non-
agricultural import tariffs are likely to yield relative protection for non-agricultural goods 
when agricultural trade shares are large. However, the simulations also indicate that 
agricultural price incentives can improve strongly when relative agricultural trade shares 
are small. 
 
Turning to the agricultural export tax simulations, Table 9 indicates that relative 
agricultural value added prices decline in all countries. The decline in relative agricultural 
price incentives is moderate for countries like Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Korea, 
Mozambique, Tanzania, Tunisia, Venezuela, and Zambia, which are characterized by 
relatively moderate agricultural export shares. On the other hand, relative agricultural 
value added prices generally drop by more than 20 percent in countries like Costa Rica, 
Malawi, Mexico, and Zimbabwe, which are characterized by high agricultural export 
shares. Relative producer prices are strongly affected by export taxes in Malawi and 
Zimbabwe. They rely heavily on agricultural exports for foreign exchange earnings, but 
induced real exchange rate depreciations around 8 ￿ 11 percent serve to dampen the 
impact. Nevertheless, a relatively strong reallocation of production factors away from 
production of Malawian export crops and Zimbabwean tobacco implies that relative 
agricultural value added at factor cost declines by 26 ￿ 29 percent. Costa Rica and 
Mexico have more diversified trade patterns. Exchange rate changes therefore create less 
relief for the negative impact on relative agricultural prices. Relative input cost changes 
exacerbate the effect in the case of Costa Rica, where relative value added prices decline 
by more than 50 percent, while they moderate the effect in the case of Mexico, leading to 
a less dramatic 22 percent decline. 
 
The cases of Morocco and Argentina indicate that country-specific circumstances such as 
input cost structures have to be taken into account. Agricultural export taxes have a much 
stronger impact on relative agricultural price incentives in Morocco compared to 
Argentina, in spite of the fact that Argentina has the higher agricultural trade share. 
Moreover, the cases of Tanzania and Zambia indicate that marketing margins are 
important. A declining price of marketing services in the case of Tanzania yields 
important support for relative agricultural value added prices. However, an increasing 
price of marketing services in Zambia indicates that marketing margins can also magnify 
the negative direct impact of agricultural export taxes on relative agricultural value added 
prices. 
 








relative value added prices includes Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Korea, Mozambique, 
Tunisia, and Venezuela. In these countries, agricultural export taxes have a small 
negative direct impact on overall agricultural producer prices because of low agricultural 
trade shares. Since changing input prices have only marginal effects on relative value 
added prices, this group of six countries only experience 0 ￿ 2 percent decreases in 
relative agricultural value added prices.  
 
Figure 8 illustrates the impact of agricultural export taxes on relative agricultural price 
incentives as a function of absolute agricultural export shares. It shows a clear negative 
relationship between the agricultural export trade share and the impact on relative 
agricultural price incentives. Agricultural export taxes lower relative agricultural price 
incentives strongly in the countries with the highest agricultural export shares, i.e. Costa 
Rica, Malawi, Mexico and Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, the variation in results indicates, as 
discussed above, that differences related to input cost and marketing margin structures 
also play a role. Interestingly, relative agricultural price incentives decline in all cases, 
even when the agricultural trade shares are small. This indicates that the direct impact on 
agricultural producer prices in every case dominates the indirect impact of tax-induced 
exchange rate depreciation on relative input costs. 
 
[Figure 8 around here] 
 
Exchange Rate Simulations 
 
The second set of simulations of stylized ISI-policies consists of five real exchange rate 
simulations, including a 20 percent depreciation (Simulation 1), a 10 percent depreciation 
(Simulation 2), a base run equilibrium (Simulation 3), a 10 percent appreciation 
(Simulation 4), and a 20 percent appreciation (Simulation 5). 
 
Table 10 presents the results of the exchange rate simulations. They indicate that changes 
to the real exchange rate have widely differing effects on relative price incentives for 
agricultural production across the sample. Appreciation of the exchange rate leads to 
consistently declining agricultural price incentives in six countries, and consistently 
improving agricultural price incentives in eight. The first group includes countries with 
high agricultural export shares (Argentina, Costa Rica, Malawi, Mexico, and Zimbabwe), 
in addition to Brazil, which has very low overall trade-shares. In contrast, countries 
where agriculture gains from an overvalued exchange rates include poorer southern 
African countries with underdeveloped agricultural (export) sectors (Mozambique, 
Tanzania, and Zambia), as well as Indonesia and traditional net-importers of food like 
Egypt, Korea, Tunisia, and Venezuela where agricultural production is virtually non-
traded. Finally, Morocco show signs of non-linearity in the impact of exchange rate 
changes on relative agricultural value added prices. 
 
[Table 10 around here] 
 
Countries where an exchange rate appreciation has a negative impact on relative 








Argentinean agricultural sector loses more from an overvalued exchange rate, since 
declining price incentives for agricultural exports dominate declining incentives for non-
agricultural exports and induced disprotection of import-competing non-agricultural 
production. The same argument goes for Malawi and Zimbabwe, while declining 
protection of import-competing agricultural products further adds to declining relative 
agricultural price incentives in Costa Rica and Mexico. In contrast, agricultural trade 
shares are relatively small in Brazil. Nevertheless, an overvalued exchange rate leads to 
lower relative agricultural price incentives, since the negative price-impact on traded food 
processing sectors feeds through to agricultural production sectors. 
 
In countries where an overvalued exchange rate has a positive impact on relative 
agricultural price incentives, agricultural trade shares are much smaller than non-
agricultural trade shares. From Table 2, most countries in this group are net-importers of 
agricultural goods (e.g., Egypt and Tunisia), and an overvalued exchange rate induces 
disprotection for import-competing agricultural crops. At the same time, declining terms-
of-trade for exports of non-agricultural goods and (tourist) services, and disprotection of 
import-competing non-agricultural production, feed through to domestic prices because 
of high non-agricultural trade shares. Agricultural price incentives improve particularly 
strongly in Tunisia, where non-agricultural trade shares are especially high. Korea and 
Venezuela are special since they are characterized by relatively large agricultural imports. 
Nevertheless, an overvalued exchange rate once again works to lower non-agricultural 
price incentives strongly for export products like manufactured goods in the case of 
Korea, and oil and gas in the case of Venezuela. 
 
Real appreciation causes relative agricultural price incentives to improve relatively 
strongly in Indonesia, since agricultural trade shares are very small.
12 Among the group 
of poorer southern African countries, Mozambique and Tanzania experience moderate 
improvements in relative agricultural price incentives compared to the strong 
improvement in the case of Zambia. Part of the reason for this difference is that the price 
of marketing margins declines in the case of Mozambique and Tanzania, while it 
increases in the case of Zambia. Finally, exchange rate appreciation tends to have a non-
linear impact on relative price incentives in Morocco. Lower import prices leads to 
increasing imports of intermediate goods. The accompanying decline in non-agricultural 
input costs, gradually comes to dominate the exchange rate induced disprotection of 
import-competing non-agricultural production. 
 
Figure 9 illustrates the changes to relative agricultural price incentives as a function of 
the exchange rate changes. The main lesson is the multiplicity of possible outcomes 
resulting from deviations of the exchange rate from its equilibrium level. The variation of 
the results shows that an overvalued exchange can have virtually any kind of impact on 
relative agricultural price incentives. Accordingly, the impact of a 20 percent exchange 
rate appreciation on relative agricultural price incentives varies from a 48 percent decline 
in the case of Costa Rica, over unchanged relative prices in the case of Morocco, to a 30 
percent increase in the case of Venezuela. The upshot of these results is that the impact of 
eliminating exchange rate imbalances is strongly dependent on specific country 
characteristics. 
                                                 









[Figure 9 around here] 
 
As argued above, one of the key structural characteristics determining the impact of 
exchange rate changes on relative agricultural price incentives is the size of relative trade 
shares. Figure 10 illustrates the impact of a 10 percent exchange rate appreciation on 
relative agricultural price incentives (simulation 4 in Table 10) as a function of relative 
agricultural trade shares. It clearly shows a negative relationship. The strongest declines 
in relative agricultural price incentives are observed for Argentina, Costa Rica, Malawi, 
Mexico, and Zimbabwe, which are also characterized by having relative agricultural trade 
shares over 100 percent. Similarly, the strongest increases in relative agricultural price 
incentives are observed for Egypt, Tunisia, Venezuela, and Zambia, where relative 
agricultural trade shares are significantly below 100 percent. This indicates that the 
combination of the terms-of-trade channel and the protection channel tend to dominate 
the input-cost channel for our sample of developing countries. Nevertheless, the 
importance of other country-specific characteristics such as marketing margins is 
illustrated by comparing Tanzania and Mozambique to Zambia. While trade shares are 
relatively similar, an exchange rate appreciation increases relative agricultural price 
incentives particularly strongly in Zambia, where the price of marketing services declines 
to the benefit of agriculture. 
 




Empirical studies from the 1980s, using partial equilibrium methodologies, supported the 
view that policies in many developing countries imparted a major incentive bias against 
agriculture. Eliminating this bias was one of the goals of policy reform strategies, 
including structural adjustment programs, supported by the World Bank and others; and 
many countries undertook such reforms in the 1990s. This paper uses a general 
equilibrium framework and provides comparative analysis of the extent to which indirect 
taxes, tariffs, and exchange rates affected relative price incentives for agricultural 
production in a representative sample of 15 developing countries in the 1990s.  
 
In contrast to earlier findings, in our sample of fifteen developing countries during the 
1990s, general equilibrium analysis indicates that the economywide system of indirect 
taxes, including tariffs and export taxes, significantly discriminated against agriculture in 
only one country, was largely neutral in five, provided a moderate subsidy to agriculture 
in four, and strongly favored agriculture in five. Earlier work found that overvaluation of 
the exchange rate would generally hurt agriculture, which was assumed to be largely 
tradable. In a general equilibrium setting, the impact of changes in the exchange rate on 
relative agriculture/non-agriculture incentives depends crucially on relative trade shares. 
If a current account deficit of three percent of absorption is considered to be the proper 
level of sustainability, the combination of exchange rate and tax policy generated a 
significant agricultural bias in only two sample countries (Malawi and Zimbabwe), while 








six was small. While the issue of determining a sustainable current account is 
controversial, our analysis indicates that tax and exchange rate policies had either little 
impact or improved relative agricultural price incentives during the 1990s. 
 
Our sample includes six countries that were also included in a comparative World Bank 
study led by Krueger, Schiff, and ValdØs, 1988: Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Korea, 
Morocco, and Zambia. Our results indicate that there are very limited signs of 
agricultural bias in these countries in the 1990s. While the estimated level of agricultural 
protection in Korea in the Bank studies resembles our results, findings of strong levels of 
agricultural bias in Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Morocco, and Zambia are not borne out by 
our general equilibrium analysis. In sum, our results suggest that the partial-equilibrium 
measures used in earlier studies tended to overstate the bias against agriculture and, in 
any case, whatever bias there was to begin with, it was largely eliminated during the 
1990s.  
 
The second part of our simulations indicates that traditional ISI-type policies, including 
non-agricultural import tariffs, agricultural export taxes, and overvalued exchange rates, 
can affect relative price incentives in strongly divergent directions, depending on 
country-specific characteristics. The impact of agricultural export taxes on relative 
overall agricultural price incentives depends strongly on agricultural export shares, and 
rarely exceed two percent for the majority of countries where agricultural export shares 
are small. In contrast, the impact of non-agricultural import tariffs was found to depend 
strongly on relative agricultural trade shares and the impact of real exchange rate 
appreciation induced by the introduction of pervasive tariffs.  
 
Our stylized exchange rate simulations tend to reaffirm the conclusion from the World 
Bank studies that appreciation of the exchange rate, resulting from a current account 
deficit, can have a strong impact on relative price incentives for tradable goods, including 
tradable agriculture. These studies found that overvaluation of the exchange rate would 
hurt agriculture, which was assumed to be largely tradable. In a general equilibrium 
setting, the impact of changes in the exchange rate on relative agriculture/non-agriculture 
incentives depends critically on relative trade shares. In our sample, overvaluation of the 
real exchange rate hurts agriculture relative to non-agriculture in six countries, while it 
favors agriculture in nine, with wide variation in the size of the effect. There is no easy 
generalization￿the impact depends on particular country characteristics. Our results 
therefore point to the essential role of country-specific characteristics and the need to take 
them into account in a general-equilibrium framework when analyzing how tax and 
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Table 1. Sample Countries 
Country  SAM data year  # ag. sectors  # non-ag. 
sectors 
# factors  1995 GNP per 
capita 
Argentina 1993 13  31  3  8030 
Brazil  1995  36 6 39 3640 
Costa Rica  1991  5  17  13  2610 
Egypt 1997  13  14  5  790 
Indonesia 1995 5  18  23  980 
Korea 1990  12  28  3  9700 
Malawi 1998  7  26  11 170 
Mexico  1996  57 14 45 3320 
Morocco 1994  31 10 14 1110 
Mozambique 1995  12  27  4  80 
Tanzania 1992  21 34  7  120 
Tunisia  1996  2 17 4 1820 
Venezuela 1995 12  40  3  3020 
Zambia  1995  14 14 10  400 
Zimbabwe 1991 24  12  9  540 
Source: Trade and Macroeconomics Division, International Food Policy Research Institute. See references to country case studies. 









Table 2. General characteristics of country models (percent) 
   VA X E M E/X  M/Q
Argentina Agric 5.5 4.1 16.6 1.2 14.4  1.7
   Indus  15.3 25.3 66.8 66.7 9.4  13.4
   Servi  79.3 70.6 16.6 32.1 0.8  2.1
Brazil Agric 9.5 7.7 5.3 4.4 2.5  2.6
   Indus  26.4 43.6 81.9 80.7 6.9  8.8
   Servi  64.1 48.7 12.8 14.9 1.0  1.3
Costa Rica  Agric 13.2 16.3 31.8 16.1 45.9  33.7
   Indus  18.5 32.6 37.9 65.9 27.9  44.0
   Servi  68.3 51.1 30.3 18.0 13.9  9.9
Egypt Agric 17.7 14.1 0.5 9.5 0.5  9.6
   Indus  24.7 36.9 37.7 77.3 12.9  28.3
   Servi  57.6 49.0 61.8 13.2 15.9  4.3
Indonesia Agric 18.4 12.8 2.1 2.9 1.7  2.9
   Indus  30.1 39.9 82.9 78.4 23.2  27.2
   Servi  51.4 47.3 15.0 18.8 4.0  5.1
Korea Agric 8.8 5.0 1.6 7.0 4.1  17.7
   Indus  30.1 50.2 79.6 85.3 20.3  23.0
   Servi  61.1 44.8 18.8 7.7 5.4  2.3
Malawi Agric 35.9 29.6 68.8 7.8 44.1  10.7
   Indus  16.1 31.4 13.6 65.7 8.2  38.4
   Servi  48.0 38.9 17.7 26.5 8.7  15.8
Mexico Agric 6.4 5.3 8.5 6.9 30.3  25.7
   Indus  22.4 38.0 91.5 93.1 45.7  44.6
   Servi  71.2 56.7 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0
Morocco Agric 19.2 13.1 8.1 5.6 7.0  14.3
   Indus  24.3 38.5 51.2 75.7 15.2  29.8
   Servi  56.6 48.4 40.8 18.7 9.6  5.6
Mozambique Agric 25.9 16.6 4.9 6.0 2.3  22.2
   Indus  10.4 15.6 43.0 75.7 27.6  67.3
   Servi  63.7 67.8 52.1 18.4 9.1  8.4
Tanzania Agric 38.6 27.0 25.6 1.4 4.7  1.4
   Indus  13.3 25.3 30.5 83.5 5.4  44.1
   Servi  48.1 47.8 43.9 15.1 5.3  6.1
Tunisia Agric 14.8 9.8 1.2 4.4 1.9  9.6
   Indus  22.4 43.4 67.1 88.2 35.2  45.4
   Servi  62.9 46.9 31.7 7.5 16.0  4.5
Venezuela Agric 4.5 4.1 0.4 4.8 1.2  15.3
   Indus  41.4 46.3 93.2 70.1 44.3  29.5
   Servi  54.1 49.6 6.5 25.1 3.0  6.5
Zambia Agric 28.5 21.8 6.4 4.6 4.5  8.8
   Indus  29.2 33.6 85.7 73.7 40.3  47.1
   Servi  42.3 44.6 7.9 21.8 2.5  10.9
Zimbabwe Agric 15.3 13.6 41.9 0.6 36.1  1.6
   Indus  31.7 36.8 35.5 93.8 11.8  37.3
 Servi  53.1 49.6 22.6 5.6 6.6  2.2
VA ￿ Value Added. E ￿ Exports. X ￿ Production. M ￿ Imports. Q ￿ Demand. 












Table 3. Marketing margins (percent) 
   MRG DMRG/DC EMRG/E  MMRG/M
Indonesia Agric  19.3 13.7 15.1  11.1
 Indus  80.7 14.2 11.5  18.1
Mozambique Agric  23.3 38.3 33.1  24.3
 Indus  76.7 31.6 15.4  23.9
Tanzania Agric  49.9 17.6 15.3  5.7
 Indus  50.1 6.5 23.2  10.7
Tunisia Agric  15.3 9.7 35.1  2.4
 Indus  84.7 10.5 3.5  9.7
Venezuela Agric  20.3 37.2 43.3  38.5
 Indus  79.7 21.4 3.8  25.6
Zambia Agric  16.2 17.3 22.8  15.3
 Indus  68.4 19.7 20.7 16.1
 Servi  15.4 4.9 29.5  0.0
Zimbabwe Agric  20.4 15.7 19.6  13.4
 Indus  79.6 15.0 16.2  15.2
MRG ￿ Total Marketing Margins. DMRG ￿ Domestic Marketing Margins. EMRG ￿ Export Marketing Margins. 
MMRG ￿ Import Marketing Margins. DC ￿ Domestically Marketed Production. E - Exports. M ￿ Imports. 










Table 4. Import Tariffs and Nominal Protection Rates (percent) 
  Import Tariffs, SAM Data  1960-84 NPR 
 Agriculture  Non-agriculture Difference Direct (Ag.) Indirect (Non-ag)  Total
Argentina 7.4  11.7 -4.3 -17.8 -21.3  -39.1
Brazil 5.9  10.3 -4.3 10.1 -18.4  -8.3
Egypt 10.9  13.3 -2.4 -24.8 -19.6  -44.4
Korea 13.9  8.3 5.6 -15.0 -17.4  -32.4
Morocco 159.8 25.3 134.5 39.0 -25.8  13.2
Zambia 7.4  13.4 -6.0 -16.4 -29.9  -46.3










Table 5. Tax and tariff structure (percent) 
      ta tq tm Te 
Argentina Agric  0.4 1.1 7.4 - 
   Indus  2.4 2.6 16.0 - 
   Servi  0.4 3.2 2.8 - 
   Sigma  0.5 0.3 1.0 - 
Brazil Agric  2.7 - 5.9 - 
   Indus  6.6 - 12.1 - 
   S e r v i   8 . 4---  
   Sigma  0.8 - 1.6 - 
Costa Rica  Agric  1.0 1.8 7.3 0.2 
   Indus  1.0 4.4 8.1 -2.2 
   Servi  1.7 2.5 3.6 0.8 
   Sigma  0.2 0.9 0.9 0.7 
Egypt Agric  0.0 1.8 10.9 - 
   Indus  0.7 0.7 15.6 - 
   Servi  0.5 2.2 - - 
   Sigma  0.1 5.1 3.1 - 
Indonesia Agric  - 0.7 2.6 - 
   Indus  - 2.5 7.1 - 
   Servi  - 2.4 0.3 - 
   Sigma  - 0.3 13.5 - 
Korea Agric  -4.9 - 13.9 - 
   Indus  4.2 - 9.0 - 
   Servi  3.9 - 0.3 - 
   Sigma  1.9 - 2.1 - 
Malawi Agric  - 0.9 1.4 0.5 
   Indus  - 7.3 8.8 - 
   S e r v i   ----  
   Sigma  - 0.7 1.7 0.1 
Mexico Agric  -0.1 0.2 1.2 - 
   Indus  1.8 1.3 2.1 - 
   Servi  2.2 0.8 - - 
   Sigma  0.3 0.2 0.3 - 
ta ￿ Production Taxes/Subsidies, tq ￿ Consumption Taxes/Subsidies. 
te ￿ Export Taxes/Subsidies, tm ￿ Import Tariffs. 
Agric ￿ Agriculture. Indus ￿ Industry, Servi ￿ Services. 









Table 5. (cont.) Tax and tariff structure (percent) 
      ta tq tm Te 
Morocco Agric  - - 159.8 - 
   Indus  1.1 3.7 31.6 - 
   Servi  2.2 0.1 - - 
   Sigma  0.2 0.6 29.6 - 
Mozambique Agric  -0.4 2.7 4.8 0.0 
   Indus  -0.1 5.3 8.9 0.0 
   Servi  -0.1 1.3 - - 
   Sigma  0.1 0.7 1.2 0.0 
Tanzania Agric  0.8 0.2 7.2 - 
   Indus  2.0 3.2 5.0 - 
   Servi  0.5 0.1 - - 
   Sigma  0.4 0.4 0.6 - 
Tunisia Agric  1.0 -3.6 2.5 - 
   Indus  0.8 6.5 9.3 - 
   Servi  -0.8 1.7 - - 
   Sigma  0.6 0.9 6.4 - 
Venezuela Agric  0.0 - 12.0 - 
   Indus  0.8 3.8 9.1 - 
   Servi  0.7 1.8 - - 
   Sigma  0.6 0.4 0.9 - 
Zambia Agric  0.6 0.1 7.4 - 
   Indus  4.2 1.9 13.5 - 
   Servi  1.0 1.2 13.1 - 
   Sigma  0.9 1.1 1.8 - 
Zimbabwe Agric  3.3 - 20.2 - 
   Indus  2.9 - 23.8 - 
   Servi  3.1 - 11.4 - 
   Sigma  1.9 - 3.5 - 
ta ￿ Production Taxes/Subsidies, tq ￿ Consumption Taxes/Subsidies. 
te ￿ Export Taxes/Subsidies, tm ￿ Import Tariffs. 
Agric ￿ Agriculture. Indus ￿ Industry, Servi ￿ Services. 









Table 6. Agricultural bias simulations 
   Sim.1 Sim.2 Sim.3 Sim.4  Sim.5 
   BASE ta tq te  Tm 
Argentina PVA  100.0 99.6 98.8 98.8  102.4 
 QVA  100.0 99.9 99.6 99.6  101.8 
Brazil PVA  100.0 99.3 99.3 99.3  100.3 
 QVA  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 
Costa Rica  PVA  100.0 97.7 96.9 92.0  97.1 
 QVA  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 
Egypt PVA  100.0 99.1 94.3 94.3  89.4 
 QVA  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 
Indonesia PVA  100.0 100.0 99.2 99.2  97.1 
 QVA  100.0 100.0 99.9 99.9  99.8 
Korea PVA  100.0 85.6 85.6 85.6  82.8 
 QVA  100.0 98.0 98.0 98.0  97.5 
Malawi PVA  100.0 100.0 106.8 107.2 108.2 
 QVA  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 
Mexico PVA  100.0 95.2 94.2 94.2 94.0 
 QVA  100.0 99.8 99.7 99.7  99.7 
Morocco PVA  100.0 93.6 90.0 90.0  67.6 
 QVA  100.0 99.9 99.9 99.9  99.6 
Mozambique PVA  100.0 99.6 92.4 92.4  87.4 
 QVA  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 
Tanzania PVA  100.0 97.2 94.5 94.5  92.4 
 QVA  100.0 99.7 99.3 99.3  99.1 
Tunisia PVA  100.0 99.4 92.9 92.9 87.3 
 QVA  100.0 99.9 99.0 99.0  98.3 
Venezuela PVA  100.0 99.3 95.3 95.3  93.0 
 QVA  100.0 99.8 98.7 98.7  98.1 
Zambia PVA  100.0 96.2 95.7 95.7 94.0 
 QVA  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 
Zimbabwe PVA  100.0 98.5 98.5 98.5  102.4 
 QVA  100.0 99.3 99.3 99.3  100.3 
NOTE: The elimination of indirect taxes are additive, i.e. Simulation 2 represents the elimination of ta 
while Simulation 5 represents the elimination of ta, tq, te, and tm. 
ta ￿ Production Taxes/Subsidies, tq ￿ Consumption Taxes/Subsidies, 
te ￿ Export Taxes/Subsidies, tm ￿ Import Tariffs, 


































Table 8. Sustainable current account simulations 
    Sim. 1 Sim. 2 Sim. 3 Sim. 4 Sim. 5  Sim. 6
   base -20% -40% -60% -80%  -100%
Argentina PVA  100.0 104.1 108.4 112.7 117.0  121.4
   QVA  100.0 102.5 104.9 107.4 109.7  112.1
   EXR  100.0 103.7 106.8 109.5 112.1  114.4
Brazil PVA  100.0 101.4 102.7 104.0 105.3  106.5
   QVA  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0
   EXR  100.0 105.2 110.0 114.5 118.8  122.9
Costa Rica  PVA  100.0 102.9 105.6 108.3 110.8  113.2
   QVA  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0
   EXR  100.0 101.1 102.1 103.1 104.1  105.0
Egypt PVA  100.0 101.7 103.5 105.3 107.2  109.1
   QVA  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0
   EXR  100.0 98.3 96.6 94.8 93.0  91.2
Indonesia PVA  100.0 94.9 90.3 86.3 82.7 79.5
   QVA  100.0 99.8 99.6 99.4 99.3  99.2
   EXR  100.0 105.6 110.3 114.2 117.5  120.3
Korea PVA  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0
   QVA  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0
   EXR  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0
Malawi PVA  100.0 103.5 106.5 109.0 111.0 112.6
   QVA  100.0 100.0 99.9 99.7 99.6  99.4
   EXR  100.0 103.6 106.7 109.6 112.3  114.6
Mexico PVA  100.0 99.7 99.4 99.2 98.9 98.6
   QVA  100.0 99.9 99.9 99.8 99.7  99.6
   EXR  100.0 100.2 100.4 100.5 100.7  100.9
Morocco PVA  100.0 100.0 100.1 100.1 100.1 100.2
   QVA  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0
   EXR  100.0 101.1 102.1 103.2 104.2  105.2
Mozambique PVA  100.0 90.1 82.4 76.3 71.3 67.2
   QVA  100.0 100.0 100.0 99.8 99.4  98.9
   EXR  100.0 102.4 104.7 106.8 108.8  110.7
Tanzania PVA  100.0 96.5 93.2 90.2 87.5 85.2
   QVA  100.0 99.8 99.5 99.2 98.9  98.7
   EXR  100.0 105.4 109.5 112.9 115.6  118.0
Tunisia PVA  100.0 99.1 98.2 97.3 96.5 95.6
   QVA  100.0 99.9 99.9 99.8 99.8  99.7
   EXR  100.0 100.6 101.3 101.9 102.5  103.1
Venezuela PVA  100.0 107.8 116.4 126.1 137.2 150.2
   QVA  100.0 101.3 102.6 103.9 105.3  106.8
   EXR  100.0 94.7 88.6 81.7 73.6  63.7
Zambia PVA  100.0 94.0 92.3 91.7 91.2 90.6
   QVA  100.0 100.0 99.8 99.5 99.2  98.8
   EXR  100.0 107.3 112.2 116.0 119.3  122.0
Zimbabwe PVA  100.0 102.6 105.1 107.6 110.0 112.3
   QVA  100.0 100.9 101.8 102.6 103.4  104.2
   EXR  100.0 102.4 104.7 106.8 108.8  110.7
VA ￿ Value Added, E ￿ Exports, X ￿ Production, M ￿ Imports, Q ￿ Demand. 












Table 9. Traditional ISI-simulations (CA=0) 
   Sim.1 Sim.2 Sim.3 
   BASE tm te 
Argentina PVA  100.0 92.9 96.4 
 QVA  100.0 95.7 97.2 
Brazil PVA  100.0 95.3 99.2 
 QVA  100.0 100.0 100.0 
Costa Rica  PVA  100.0 82.8 48.1 
 QVA  100.0 100.0 100.0 
Egypt PVA  100.0 107.4 99.2 
 QVA  100.0 100.0 100.0 
Indonesia PVA  100.0 106.1 98.2 
 QVA  100.0 100.3 99.9 
Korea PVA  100.0 106.0 97.6 
 QVA  100.0 100.7 99.4 
Malawi PVA  100.0 91.9 74.1 
 QVA  100.0 99.9 99.1 
Mexico PVA  100.0 110.2 78.4 
 QVA  100.0 100.8 98.9 
Morocco PVA  100.0 99.4 85.2 
 QVA  100.0 100.0 99.7 
Mozambique PVA  100.0 114.7 97.6 
 QVA  100.0 100.0 100.0 
Tanzania PVA  100.0 108.2 94.9 
 QVA  100.0 100.7 99.4 
Tunisia PVA  100.0 115.8 98.0 
 QVA  100.0 101.6 99.8 
Venezuela PVA  100.0 104.2 98.7 
 QVA  100.0 100.8 99.7 
Zambia PVA  100.0 100.0 89.3 
 QVA  100.0 100.0 100.0 
Zimbabwe PVA  100.0 95.0 78.4 
 QVA  100.0 98.6 92.3 
te ￿ 25 Percent Agricultural Export Taxes. 
tm ￿ 25 Percent Non-agricultural Import Tariffs. 





Table 10. Exchange rate simulations (CA=0) 
    Sim.1 Sim.2 Sim.3 Sim.4 Sim.5
   +20% +10% BASE -10%  -20%
Argentina PVA  133.7 114.8 100.0 91.3 86.3
 QVA  118.1 108.5 100.0 94.6 91.4
Brazil PVA  105.4 102.6 100.0 97.6 95.6
 QVA  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Costa Rica  PVA  149.1 124.9 100.0 75.4 51.9
 QVA  100.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.2
Egypt PVA  78.3 89.0 100.0 111.0 121.9
 QVA  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Indonesia PVA  78.8 90.1 100.0 108.7 116.4
 QVA  99.1 99.6 100.0 100.4 100.7
Korea PVA  73.8 88.5 100.0 109.2 116.7
 QVA  96.2 98.5 100.0 101.0 101.7
Malawi
1  PVA  119.8 112.8 100.0 86.9 78.1
 QVA  97.8 99.4 100.0 99.0 95.1
Mexico
1  PVA  113.5 106.7 100.0 92.7 85.0
 QVA  99.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Morocco PVA  95.4 98.2 100.0 100.7 100.4
 QVA  99.7 99.9 100.0 100.1 100.2
Mozambique
1  PVA  81.1 92.1 100.0 105.0 107.3
 QVA  99.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.1
Tanzania
1  PVA  87.2 93.4 100.0 104.2 106.3
 QVA  100.9 99.9 100.0 100.1 100.1
Tunisia PVA  66.8 83.8 100.0 114.5 126.5
 QVA  97.1 98.8 100.0 101.0 101.8
Venezuela
2  PVA  7.8 71.0 100.0 115.3 129.5
 QVA  41.7 92.7 100.0 102.6 104.6
Zambia
1  PVA  90.2 93.5 100.0 112.6 127.6
 QVA  98.8 99.8 100.0 100.0 100.1
Zimbabwe PVA  123.2 111.2 100.0 89.9 81.3
 QVA  107.6 103.8 100.0 96.3 92.9
1 Exchange rate changes are (+5%,+2‰%,BASE,-15%,-30%) for Malawi, Mexico, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia. 
2 Exchange rate changes are (+30%,+15%,BASE,-7‰%,-15%) for Venezuela. 




Figure 1. Tax and Tariff Experiments,
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Figure 2. Import Tariff Experiments,
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Figure 3. Current Account Experiments,
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Figure 4. Current Account Experiments,
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Figure 5. Current Account Experiments,
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Figure 6. Import Tariff Experiments,
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Figure 7. Import Tariff Experiments,
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Figure 8. Export Tax Experiments,
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Figure 9. Stylized Exchange Rate Experiments,
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Figure 10. Exchange Rate Experiments
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